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Article 9

LAVERNE AND SHIRLEY MEET THE
CONSTITUTION
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW.
TON: HARVARD UNIV. PRESS,

BRUCE ACKERMAN.

Bos-

1984.

Reviewed by David Fraser*
There is a theory which states that if ever anyone discovers exactly what the
Universe is for and why it is here, it will instantly disappear and be replaced by
something even more bizarre and inexplicable.
There is another which states that this has already happened.'

Dialogue -

Prologue at the Margin

Zaphod Beelbebrox (ZB): Bruce! Hey, Bruce!
Bruce Ackerman (BA): Yeah?
ZB:
Bruce, you know, on my intergalactic travels I've seen lots of
really weird stuff.
BA:
Yeah?
ZB;
See, it's this way Bruce. We've been searching for the answer
to the Big Question in a lot of galaxies, but so far, no luck.
So, I thought that here on Earth I'd take a shot.
BA:
Yeah?
ZB:
Well, Bruce, I just read Social Justice in the Liberal State.
BA:
It's really a great book, isn't it?
ZB:
To be honest, Bruce, it suffers from one slight defect.
BA:
What's that?
ZB:
It doesn't answer the Big Question, Bruce.
BA:
Zaphod, don't panic! I've written another book, Reconstructing American Law. The Big Question is answered there.
ZB:
I'll get back to you Bruce.
"Don't panic!"
*

-

This is the message of Bruce Ackerman's latest con-

Copyright, 1984, David Fraser.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Dalhousie University. This review is dedicated to my colleague,
Vaughan Black, who has accused me of not taking liberalism seriously.
I Douglas Adams, The Hitchiker's Guide to the Galaxy. This book, along with The Restaurant at the End of the Universe and Life, the Universe and Everything and So Long and Thanks
for All the Fish, chronicles the intergalactic adventures of Zaphod Beelbebrox, Former Head
Honcho of All Creation and his companions as they search for the answer to the Big Question.
The analogy to liberal scholarship should be obvious.
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tribution to legal scholarship, Reconstructing American Law. Its self-3
proclaimed goal is to permit us 2 to practise law in the "activist state".
We require such a programme because of the fall from grace which
was one of the consequences of the New Deal. "We the people" ate
from the tree of knowledge during this period and our mores and social
structures were irrevocably changed. The New Deal radically altered
the psyche of America; it modified forever the premises of American
liberalism. Worst of all, it subverted the powerful rhetoric of the legal
profession.
This destabilization of legal discourse is, in Ackerman's world
view, the most nefarious consequence of the New Deal. The reaction of
the profession, epitomized by the Legal Realist critique, was to seek to
restabilize its own linguistic community. This, according to Ackerman,
is where we blew it. Rather than recognizing the activist, interventionist nature of the new state and creating a legal language for progress,
the Realist attack on traditional legal values was used to provide "the
professional community with a credible means of insulating the established universe of legal meanings from the political crisis in which it
has been implicated."" As a result, lawyers have been left behind with
their antiquated language and concepts which bear little resemblance
to "political" reality. Such, in general terms, is the Problem According
to Bruce Ackerman. I shall accept this characterization, for here I have
a more fundamental concern, one which should be shared by Ackerman's fellow liberals and his radical opponents. This book does not deliver what it promises.
We are teased and titillated throughout with references to "normative arguments" and "values", but what this book really lacks is a
serious discussion of any values of real interest. To be sure, we are
informed that Ackerman thinks that Pareto efficiency may well be a
value worth striving for and that lawyers must cope with computers at
a level of sophistication greater than mere ability to call up the latest
decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court on Westlaw or Lexis. But,
who cares? Again, Ackerman provides us with exciting prose and inter' The use of the collective pronoun is not accidental. Ackerman's entire purpose is to permit
the profession to regain a favoured position in society. Like all good liberals, however, he is not
unconscious of the requirement that this be done while preserving at least the impression that "the
people" ultimately rule.
3 An activist state is one in which "the very structure of our society depends upon a continuing flow of self-conscious decisions made by politically accountable state officials." Ackerman,
Reconstructing American Law (1984) at 1. That this view is one of democracy "from the top" is
obvious. For an intriguing analysis of this problem in another context, see Marcuse, Soviet Marx-

ism (1961).
4 Ackerman, id. at 17.
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esting insights, but fails to deal with the Big Question. Liberals will be
unable to find a unifying principle5 or normative context from which to
draw solace. Radical opponents of liberalism will be unable once again
to pin down liberals in any debate about values. Ackerman, the messenger Hermes of liberalism, is as slippery as quicksilver.
Ackerman cannot be so easily dismissed, however. For we find in
Reconstructing American Law a hidden agenda, one which is found at

the margins of the text and at the margins of traditional liberal discourse.6 In these margins, it becomes possible to find out what Ackerman thinks about values. His goal is made abundantly clear. He wishes
to provide the American lawyer, that species endangered by the predatory instincts of the New Deal, with a new lease on life. The means,
and perhaps the end, for one is never too sure when reading this book,
is language. More specifically, he seeks to provide us" with "a professionally stabilized rhetoric" and "the new language of power". For
once, a leading liberal has acknowledged the linguisticality of power
and of existence.9 Ackerman's goal becomes evident. Language is
power. Lawyer's must rise up and wrest language from the undeserving
grasp of Harvard M.B.A.'s and return it to true guardians of the Ark.10
While this marginal discourse is perhaps ironically edifying,1" it is
used by Ackerman to stake out a disingenuous position. Not only does
he fall prey to the trap which he asserts ensnared the Realist Movement, but he returns to neutrality about values: "In a democratic ac5 Except, of course, the traditional liberal "value" of neutrality. Id. at 99.
' That the agenda is found at the margin does not render its importance marginal. Ackerman
is pushing liberalism to its limits, which are no limits at all. Liberalism is being unfolded, invaginated, impregnated with its own limitlessness. See Derrida, "Living On: Border Lines" in Hartman, ed., Deconstructionand Criticism (1979) at 97. "Invagination is ... the inverted reapplication of the outer edge to the inside of a form where the outside then opens a pocket. Such an
invagination is possible from the first trace on. This is why there is no 'first' trace." Derrida
expands on his theory of double invagination in The Law of Genre (1983), 7 Glyph 202.
The irony of this review is not without import. If this review has any authority, it is because
it is written by one of us, for us, in a law journal aimed at us. We become increasingly like the
Jesuits and the Franciscans, fighting for divine approval, engaging in incestuous battles, and forgetting about the Big Question. See Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews (1937), 23 Va. L. R. 23,
and Woe Unto You Lawyersl (1939).
8 Ackerman, supra note 3, at 3, 42. He appears, at first blush, to propose a "strong reading"
for legal language. Unlike Bloom's strong poet, however, he remains unwilling to betray his forefathers aggressively. See Bloom, A Map of Misreading (1975) and "The Breaking of Form" in
Deconstruction and Criticism, supra note 6, at 1. "But change in poetry and criticism as in any
human endeavour comes about only through aggression." Id. at 76.
' See Derrida, Of Grammatology (1976) and Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975).
10 See Goodrich, Rhetoric as Jurisprudence(1984), 4 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 887.
" Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirrorof Nature (1980). Ackerman's discourse, while hardly
unmasking fundamental contradictions, does make "one want to cut free from the words of the
tribe." This effect is, in all likelihood, unintended. Rorty, Habermas and Lyotard on Post-Modernity (1984), 4 Praxis Int. 32.
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tivist state, it is up to the people and not their lawyers, to decide upon
the activist principles that will inform the legal system." 2 The selfprofessed goal of ReconstructingAmerican Law is to provide lawyers
with the power as language, or more simply, with power. But the great
constraining principle of liberal activism is neutrality. Lawyers then
must seek out the tools of neutral power. Such an oxymoronic agenda
should trouble us all.
Except for such useless broad generalizations, it is a vain search
for a pragmatic outline of these tools in ReconstructingAmerican Law.
We can find them, however, in another of Ackerman's recently published works, Discoveringthe Constitution."3 In this more erudite exposition of his thoughts about "law and politics", Ackerman attempts to
grapple with the by now well-known "counter majoritarian difficulty".
Like all liberal lawyers, he must find a theoretical justification for the
continuing elitist role of the profession. A more serious study of this
work, and its proper place in the corpus juris Ackermanum, than that
which I offer here, will be required. I wish to focus briefly on but one
aspect of Ackerman's thought, the theory of the "constitutional moment". Let him explain himself:
One form of political action - I shall call it constitutional politics - is characterized by Publian appeals to the common good, ratified by a mobilized mass of
American citizens expressing their assent through extraordinary institutional
forms. Although constitutional politics is the highest kind of politics, it should be
permitted to dominate the nation's life only during rare periods of heightened
political consciousness. During the long periods between these constitutional moments, a second form of activity - I shall call it normal politics - prevails.
Here, factions try to manipulate14 the constitutional forms of political life to pursue their own narrow interests.

During most of our lives, "normality" reigns. We get up, get the
kids off to school, go to work, come home and watch Laverne and Shirley. Politics, unless we are part of a "faction", is external, a foreign
discourse to which our one-dimensional existence gives us little access.
Then a crisis arises. Laverne and Shirley is interrupted by a news flash,
"All is not well!" We rise up and invoke "extraordinary institutional
forms." Life returns to normal and, if we are lucky, we all get cable.
The most serious difficulty with this theory is that it ignores reality. Extraordinary forms, like most of the normal forms of politics, belong not to the people but to lawyers and other hegemonic elites. How
12 Ackerman, supra note 3, at 3. It is hard to see how the new rhetoric of the Eighties will
enable the profession to do anything but argue in the "normal" way. Ackerman simply argues
that a new normality may have left lawyers behind.

13 The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution (1984), 93 Yale L. J. 1013.
14 Ackerman,

supra note 3, at 1022 (footnotes omitted).
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do we the people know when a constitutional moment arises? What are
the values and norms which, when challenged, raise the collective ire?
Ackerman offers no evidence, merely a call to outdated traditional
democratic analysis.
This should not be surprising, for his entire problematic programme is based on nothing but power. Lawyers recognize a constitutional moment when they see one because they have read Alexander
Bickel. Lawyers know what the fundamental values are because the
values and the structures which reflect them belong to their limited
professional universe.
The Laverne and Shirley theory of constitutional law simply pretends to democratize ideals while promoting and preserving the hegemony of legalism. Lawyers' structures are strengthened as lawyers' language is expanded. What we need, then, is to change channels. We
must find a Twilight Zone of constitutional theory and practice. We
must escape from the normalization which Ackerman seeks to impose,
to a dimension not only of sight and sound, but one of imagination. The
key to that new dimension is our mind, a place where belief, passion
and desire rule, where not only the Big Question but the Answer are
unnecessary.15 Let us imagine a world without lawyers.
Epilogue ZB:
BA:
ZB:
BA:
ZB:

Dialogue Return to the Margins

Bruce! Bruce!
Yeah!
Bruce, I've read Reconstructing American Law.
Great book, isn't it?
Bruce, get a grip!

15 Deleuze & Guatarri, L'Anti-Oedipe (1972) at 197.

